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We equip choreography-level session descriptions with a simple abstraction of a security infrastruc-
ture. Message components may be enclosed within (possibly nested) ”boxes” annotated with the
intended source and destination of those components. The boxes are to be implemented with cryp-
tography.
Strand spaces provide a semantics for these choreographies, in which some roles may be played
by compromised principals. A skeleton is a partially ordered structure containing local behaviors
(strands) executed by regular (non-compromised) principals. A skeleton is realized if it contains
enough regular strands so that it could actually occur, in combination with any possible activity
of compromised principals. It is delivery guaranteed (DG) realized if, in addition, every message
transmitted to a regular participant is also delivered.
We define a novel transition system on skeletons, in which the steps add regular strands. These
steps solve tests, i.e. parts of the skeleton that could not occur without additional regular behavior.
We prove three main results about the transition system. First, each minimal DG realized skeleton
is reachable, using the transition system, from any skeleton it embeds. Second, if no step is possible
from a skeleton A, then A is DG realized. Finally, if a DG realized A′ is accessible from A, then A′
is minimal. Thus, the transition system provides a systematic way to construct the possible behaviors
of the choreography, in the presence of compromised principals.
1 Introduction
Distributed transactions are increasingly central to our economic and social infrastructure. Rigorous,
type-based notions of session are thus subjects of intense exploration, as they can ensure that commu-
nications among principals are properly coordinated [14, 11, 12, 2, 13]. However, sessions require a
security infrastructure, since the data they carry may be sensitive, and a transaction may (for instance)
transfer money from one person to another. Standard security infrastructures, such as TLS [7] for web
interactions, are two-party, point-to-point mechanisms. When a transaction involves more than two
parties—for instance, a buyer, a seller, and a bank—then it is hard to see how to use TLS sessions to
ensure that the parties get any security guarantees.
An alternative—given a session choreography—is to synthesize a security infrastructure that is ap-
propriate to the goals of that session [5, 6]. This infrastructure is effectively a custom cryptographic
protocol generated specifically to ensure that malicious principals cannot undermine the behavior that
the advertised session choreography promises to compliant principals. Generating this protocol, and en-
suring its correctness, requires reasoning at several levels, including both the choreography level and the
cryptographic level.
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2 Choreographies, Secure Boxes and Compromised Principals
In this paper we study reasoning specifically at the choreography level, without introducing the com-
plexities of realistic cryptography. These complexities include selection of public-key and symmetric
cryptographic primitives, as well as key distribution. Another recent paper which treats protocols by an
abstraction of their cryptographic mechanisms is [1].
We use a simple choreography-level specification for security of parts of messages, which we call
boxes. A box [M]ρ1ρ2 represents the fact that message M will be sent in some format x such that, if ρ1
and ρ2 are uncompromised roles, then x was prepared only by ρ1 and can be opened only by ρ2. Boxes
may appear nested inside other boxes. Naturally, any implementation of boxes will require cryptography.
We might implement boxes by message structures in which ρ1,ρ2 first agree on a shared secret, and then
use it to encrypt and provide message authentication for M (and other messages as determined by the
choreography). The first step of agreeing on a shared secret may rely on public-key cryptography. Boxes
are a mechanism to specify when a message component achieves secrecy and integrity between two
uncompromised principals, despite other compromised principals behaving unpredictably or maliciously.
In this paper, we will develop a method to define the possible behaviors of a choreography as a
function of a choice of compromised roles R. That is, given an assumption that principals not in R will
behave in accordance with their roles in the choreography, we would like to define all possible behaviors
a choreography execution can exhibit. To do so, we translate each choreography description into a set of
strands. Each of these strands represents a possible local behavior of one principal in a single session,
running a role of the choreography. These regular, non-compromised strands may interact with each
other and with any behavior within the power of the adversary, to produce a variety of global executions.
We give a method for generating all of these global executions, or more precisely, for finding the minimal,
essentially different executions.
We call these minimal, essentially different executions shapes. Each shape is a shape relative to some
starting point, typically some assumed local strand representing a behavior of a single participant. The
shapes describe the possible explanations for the experience of this participant, i.e. what other local exe-
cutions (strands) of regular participants would be needed in possible runs, in combination with adversary
actions. They are minimal in that no lesser amount of regular behavior would yield a full explanation of
regular activity in the starting point.
We generate shapes via a transition system defined by two rules. One rule says that additional strands
must be added when a participant receives a box that the adversary could not create, and which is not yet
explained by an earlier transmission from an uncompromised strand. It also applies to situations where
a box has been removed from nested boxes, and only regular strands can extract it.
The other rule corresponds to the usual choreography assumption on the communication medium.
This assumption is that the medium is resilient, i.e. that when an uncompromised participant sends a
message to another uncompromised participant, then that message will be delivered. Since we work in
a partially ordered execution model, there is no assumption about when this message will be delivered,
relative to causally unrelated actions. We present three main results.
1. In the transition system defined by our two rules, and relative to a chosen assumption R about
compromised roles, if A′ is any shape compatible with a starting point A, then A −→∗ A′. The
same holds for shapes with guaranteed delivery. (Thm. 1.)
2. When we start from a single strand A, then any maximal trace A −→∗S A′ 6→ terminates with a
shape A′ with delivery guaranteed. (Thm. 2.)
3. Every trace starting from a single strand terminates. (Thm. 3.)
In particular, the first point holds for all strand spaces based on boxes, while the second and third are
specific to strand spaces defined as the semantics of choreographies in a particular syntax.
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2 Abstract Strand Spaces
2.1 Basic Definitions
Definition 1 (Messages and Boxes). Messages M and boxes b are defined:
W ::= v | b M ::= W˜ b ::= [M˜]ρ1ρ2
where ·˜ denotes a tuple of zero or more elements. v is a basic value—belonging to a finite set of basic
values—and ρi ranges over the set of rolesR.
A message M can either be a value v or a box [M˜]ρ1ρ2 . We also use letter c to denote boxes. A box is a
tuple of messages Mi from ρ1 that can only be opened by ρ2.
A strand space, first introduced in [15] as a formalism for reasoning about cryptographic protocols, is
a collection of strands. Here, we introduce abstract strand spaces, strand spaces where messages range
over M (unlike the original version with cryptography). A substitution is a function that maps basic
values to basic values. Since basic values form a finite set, there are only finitely many substitutions.
Definition 2 (Abstract Strand Space). A directed term is a pair denoted by ±M where ± ∈ {−,+} is a
direction with + representing transmission and − reception. A trace is an element of (±M)∗, the set of
finite sequences of directed terms.
An abstract strand space is a set S with a trace mapping tr : S→ (±M)∗. A strand is an element of S.
A strand space S is closed under a set of substitutions Σ, if, for every s ∈ S and σ ∈ Σ, there is an s′ ∈ S
such that tr(s′) = σ(tr(s′)).
In this paper we consider finite strand spaces that are closed under substitutions of basic values for
basic values.
Notation. If s ∈ S is a strand then s(i) denotes the ith element of the trace of s and is called node. We
write m⇒ n when n is the node immediately after m on the same strand s i.e. m = s(i) and n = s(i+1).
Also, msg(n) denotes the message of the directed term in n while neg(n) (pos(n)) holds if n is a reception
(transmission) node.
It is now interesting to see how these input/output traces could be combined together in order to form a
real execution. Skeletons express parts of an execution (with some pending transmission/reception nodes
related to adversary activity):
Definition 3 (Skeleton). Given a strand space S, a skeleton A is a finite set of regular nodes (nodes be-
longing to strands of S), denoted by nodes(A), equipped with a partial orderA on nodes(A) indicating
causal precedence (consistent with⇒). Moreover, if m⇒ n and n ∈ nodes(A), then m ∈ nodes(A).
In the rest of the paper, ≺ will denote the non-reflexive subrelation of .
Example 1. As an example, let us consider a skeleton composed by three strands. Below, outgoing and
incoming edges denote transmission and reception nodes respectively.
n1
[M]ρ1ρ3-  [M]ρ1ρ3- n2
n3
w
[M′, [M]ρ1ρ3 ]ρ2ρ3-  [M
′, [M]ρ1ρ3 ]ρ2ρ3- n4
n6

wwwwwwwwwwww
ﬀ[M
′]ρ3ρ1  ﬀ [M
′]ρ3ρ1 n5

wwwww (1)
4 Choreographies, Secure Boxes and Compromised Principals
The three strands above belong to roles ρ1, ρ2 and ρ3 respectively. If the middle strand was not there e.g.
if ρ2 were compromised, then we would have the following skeleton:
n1
[M]ρ1ρ3-  [M
′, [M]ρ1ρ3 ]ρ2ρ3- n4
n6

wwwww
ﬀ[M
′]ρ3ρ1  ﬀ [M
′]ρ3ρ1 n5

wwwww
As previously said, some roles may belong to compromised principals. In the sequel, we set R⊆R
to be the set of compromised roles. Moreover, we assume that each strand is always marked with the role
it belongs to (a strand belongs to exactly one role). On this premises, it is natural to define the untamed
behaviour of R (or adversary) in terms of penetrator strands:
Definition 4 (Abstract Penetrator). PR, the abstract penetrator for a set of compromised roles R, is the
set of strands of the forms:
(C) −M0⇒−(M1, . . . ,Mk)⇒+(M0,M1, . . . ,Mk) (A) +v˜
(S) −(M0,M1, . . . ,Mk)⇒+M0⇒+(M1, . . . ,Mk)
(B) −M˜⇒+[M˜]ρ1ρ2 where ρ1 ∈ R
(O) −[M˜]ρ1ρ2 ⇒+M˜ where ρ2 ∈ R
Above, (C) allows the penetrator to compose received messages and resend them; in (S), a compound
message can be separated and resent; (B) allows to box messages and sign them with a compromised
role (from R); with (O), the penetrator can open boxes targeted to compromised roles; and using (A), the
penetrator can send any clear text.
We can compose (instances of) the various strands above with a skeleton in order to build the graph of
interaction of a skeleton A with respect to a penetratorPR i.e. an acyclic directed graphB whose nodes
are the nodes of strands inPR and A, and whose edges can be obtained by connecting any transmitting
node m with a receiving node n such that msg(m) = msg(n). We say of two nodes m0,mk of B that
m0 B mk if there is a sequence m0,m1, . . . ,mk such that for each pair mi,mi+1, either mi A mi+1, or
mi ⇒+ mi+1 on a penetrator strand of PR, or mi is a transmission node and mi+1 is a receiving node
connected to it.
We now define a realized skeleton i.e. a skeleton that has precisely the behavior of some execution:
Definition 5 (Realized Skeleton). A skeleton A is realized if there is a graph of interaction B of A wrt
PR such that every reception node has an incoming edge, and for all nodes m,n ∈ nodes(A), m B n
implies mA n.
A shape is a minimal homomorphism preserving  that maps a skeleton into a realized one. Below,
a homomorphism H : A0 7→ A1 is node-wise injective if it is an injective function on the nodes of A0.
Moreover, H0 is node-wise less than or equal to H1, written H0 ≤ H1, if for some node-wise injective
L, L ◦H0 = H1. We then say that H0 is node-wise minimal in some set Z whenever H0 ∈ Z and for any
H ∈ Z, H ≤ H0 implies H and H0 are isomorphic.
Definition 6 (Shape [8]). H : A0 7→ A′ is a shape for A0 if H is node-wise minimal among the set of
homomorphisms H ′ : A0 7→ A′′ where A′′ is realized.
Sometimes, with an abuse of terminology, if H : A 7→ A′ is a shape for A, we shall say that A′ is a shape
for A. For instance, the skeleton in (1) is a shape for n1⇒ n6. On the other hand, because of the extra
node n4, the following realized skeleton is not a shape for n1⇒ n6:
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n1
[M]ρ1ρ3 -  [M]ρ1ρ3 - n2 ﬀ
[v]ρ2ρ3 n4
n6
ww
ﬀ[[M]ρ3ρ1 ]ρ3ρ1  ﬀ[[M]ρ3ρ1 ]ρ3ρ1 n3
ww (2)
We also consider special skeletons which guarantee that messages are delivered.
Definition 7 (Delivery-Guaranteed Skeletons). A delivery-guaranteed skeleton (DG skeleton) is a skele-
ton such that for every positive node n such msg(n) = [M˜]ρ1ρ2 and ρ2 6∈ R there exists a negative node n′
on another strand such that msg(n) =msg(n)′.
Note that (2) is not DG while (1) is. Delivery-guaranteed skeletons characterize some special shapes:
Definition 8 (Delivery-Guaranteed Shape). H :A0 7→A′ is a DG shape for A0 if H is node-wise minimal
among the set of homomorphisms H ′ : A0 7→ A′′ where A′′ is a realized and DG skeleton.
2.2 Characterizing Realized Skeletons
In this subsection, we will introduce a characterization of realized skeletons in the spirit of [9]. The idea
is to use authentication tests [8] as a method for explaining why a message is suddenly found outside
a box which was previously containing it. In general, either the box owner is compromised or else it
was transmitted by a regular strand. The following definition formalizes the idea of a message occurring
inside or outside a set of boxes.
Definition 9. A message M0 is found only within a set of boxes B in M1, written M0B M1, whenever
every occurrence of M0 in M1 is nested inside a box of B.
A message M0 is found outside B in M1, written M0 †B M1, whenever not M0B M1.
As an example, for M 6= ”Hi”, M is found only within {[M]ρ1ρ2 , [[M,”Hi”]ρ3ρ1 ,”Hi”]ρ3ρ4} in [[M]ρ1ρ2 ]ρ2ρ3
and [[[(M,”Hi”)]ρ3ρ1 ,”Hi”]ρ3ρ4 ]ρ4ρ1 . Also, M is found only within {[”Hi”]ρ3ρ1} in [[”Hi”]ρ1ρ2]ρ3ρ1 as it
does not occur at all. On the contrary, M is found outside {[”Hi”]ρ1ρ2} in [M, [”Hi”]ρ1ρ2 ]ρ3ρ4 .
Given a skeleton, a set of boxes and a message, we can highlight those minimal nodes for which such
a message is found only outside the boxes. This is formalized by the notion of cut:
Definition 10 (Cut). Let M be a message, B a set of boxes and A a skeleton. Then,
Cut(M,B,A) = {n ∈ nodes(A) : ∃mA n and M †B msg(m)}
Cut(M,B,A) is defined whenever there exists a node n in A such that M †B msg(n).
Note that M occurs outside B in all minimal nodes of Cut(M,B,A). In the following skeleton A,
n1
[[M]ρ1ρ3 ]ρ1ρ2-  [[M]ρ1ρ3 ]ρ1ρ2- n2
n3
w
[M′, [M]ρ1ρ3 ]ρ2ρ3-  [M
′, [M]ρ1ρ3 ]ρ2ρ3- n4
n6

wwwwwwwww
ﬀ[[M]ρ1ρ3 ]ρ2ρ1 ﬀ [[M]ρ1ρ3 ]ρ3ρ2 n5
ww (3)
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Cut([M]ρ1ρ3 ,B,A) is the set {n3,n4,n5,n6} with minimal nodes {n3,n6} for B = {[[M]ρ1ρ3 ]ρ1ρ2} and the
whole skeleton A for B = /0 (assuming that {n1} ∈ ρ1, {n2,n3,n6} ∈ ρ2 and {n4,n5} ∈ ρ3 and no role is
in R). Also, Cut([M]ρ1ρ3 ,B,A) = {n6} for B= {[[M]ρ1ρ3 ]ρ3ρ2} but empty if ρ2 were compromised. In the
subskeleton A′ composed by nodes n1 and n2 we have Cut([M]ρ1ρ3 ,{[[M]ρ1ρ3 ]ρ1ρ2},A′) = /0.
The idea behind authentication tests is that any minimal node in a cut needs to be explained in the
skeleton. In other words, there must be an earlier sequence of events that extracted the message out of
some box or legally created it. Formally,
Definition 11 (Solved Cut). A cut Cut(M,B,A) is solved wrt a set of compromised roles R, if for any of
its ≺A-minimal nodes m1:
1. either m1 is a transmission node;
2. or M = [M˜]ρ1ρ2 and ρ1 ∈ R, or for some [M˜]ρ1ρ2 ∈ B, ρ2 ∈ R.
The definition above says that a cut Cut(M,B,A) is solved whenever, for every minimal reception node n,
M is outside B in n because of some penetrator activity. For instance, in (3), Cut([M]ρ1ρ3 ,B,A) = {n6} is
not solved for B= {[[M]ρ1ρ3 ]ρ3ρ2 , [[M]ρ1ρ3 ]ρ1ρ2 , [M, [M]ρ1ρ3 ]ρ2ρ3} and R= /0 while it is solved if R= {ρ2}.
The above definition turns to be a crucial property of realized skeletons. In fact, the following proposition
states that the property of being realized is characterized by all if its cuts being solved.
Proposition 1. Let A be a skeleton. Then, every cut in A is solved if and only if A is realized.
Proof. ⇒:
We prove this by contradiction. Assume that A is not realized. Then, by definition, there must be an
input node n containing a message that a penetratorPR is not allowed to send i.e. there is some node n
such that, for all m ≺A n, either (i) ρ1 6∈ R, [M˜]ρ1ρ2 is nested in msg(n) and does not occur in msg(m);
or (ii) for some message M and ρ2 6∈ R, we have that M †{[M˜]ρ1ρ2}msg(n) and M{[M˜]ρ1ρ2}msg(m).
If (i) holds, then Cut([M˜]ρ1ρ2 , /0,A) is clearly unsolved. Similarly, if (ii) then Cut(M,{[M˜]ρ1ρ2},A) is
unsolved.
⇐: Assume that there is a cut Cut(M,B,A)which is not solved. That means, that there is a minimal
input node where M is only found inside B and such that M 6= [M˜]ρ1ρ2 for ρ1 ∈ R, and for no [M˜]ρ1ρ2 ∈ B,
ρ2 ∈ R. But then, there is no penetrator activity which could derive M henceAwould not be realized.
We conclude this section observing that an unsolved cut implies the existence of another unsolved
cut whose boxes B are messages appearing in the current skeleton. In the sequel, let the relation M @M′
hold whenever M is contained in M′ (v is the reflexive closure).
Proposition 2. Let A be a skeleton and Cut([M]ρ1ρ2 ,B,A) an unsolved cut. Then, Cut([M]ρ1ρ2 ,B′,A)
is also unsolved for B′ = {b | n′ ≺A n s.t. [M˜]ρ1ρ2 @ b v msg(n′)∧ rcv(b) 6∈ R } for some A-minimal
input node n in Cut([M]ρ1,ρ2 ,B,A) and ρ1 6∈ R.
Proof. Let c = [M˜]ρ1ρ2 . From Definition 11, there exists a A-minimal input node n in Cut(c,B,A),
such that ρ1 6∈ R and ρ4 6∈ R for all [M˜]ρ3ρ4 ∈ B. Let us now consider the predecessors n′ of n in A which,
by definition of cut, are such that cB msg(n′). We consider two cases: (i) if none of n’s predecessors
contains c then B′= /0 and therefore Cut(c, /0,A) is unsolved as n is a minimal node such that c† /0msg(n′);
(ii) n1 . . .nk are n’s predecessors such that c@msg(ni). Letting
Bi = {b | c@ bvmsg(ni) and rec(b) 6∈ R},
Bi ⊆ B, because n is a minimal node in Cut(c,B,A). Thus, as c
⋃
i Bi msg(ni), n is also minimal in
Cut(c,
⋃
i Bi,A). Finally, as B′ =
⋃
i Bi, we can conclude that Cut(c,B′,A) is also unsolved.
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3 Searching for Shapes
The results on cuts suggest a possible way of adding nodes to a skeleton so that it can become realized.
We shall now address this problem and introduce a constructive method for deriving realized skeletons
from non-realized ones. In the sequel, the operation A ∪ ↑m with m≺ n, returns the skeleton A′ consist-
ing of A and the nodes {m′ | m′⇒∗ m∧m′ ∈ nodes(S)}, with the ordering strengthened so that m≺A′ n.
Similarly, A ∪ ↑m with n≺ m is the corresponding A′ with the opposite order enrichment n≺A′ m.
Definition 12 (Reduction Rules). The relation between skeletons A −→S A′, is the minimum relation
satisfying the following rules:
(A1)
n ∈ A ∧ neg(n) c = [M˜]ρ1ρ2 c †B msg(n)
m ∈ S\A ∧ pos(m) ρ1 6∈ R c †B msg(m)
∀m′ .m′ ≺A n∨m′⇒+ m implies cB msg(m′)
A −→S A ∪ ↑m with m≺ n
(A2)
n ∈ A ∧ pos(n) msg(n) = [M˜]ρ1ρ2 ¬(∃m
′ ∈ neg(A). n≺ m′∧msg(m′) =msg(n))
ρ2 6∈ R m ∈ (S) ∧ neg(m) ∧ msg(m) =msg(n)
A −→S A ∪ ↑m with n≺ m
where the set of strands S (strand space domain) is the set of regular strands. Observe in rule (A1) that
if there is any B that satisfies the premise, then
B = {b | n′ ≺A n s.t. [M˜]ρ1ρ2 @ bvmsg(n′)∧ rcv(b) 6∈ R }
We briefly comment the rules above. The first rule adds, when possible, nodes that explain why a
message is found outside a box. Given a box c, the set of boxes B and a node n which is minimal in
Cut(c,B,A), we choose m to be the minimal node preceding n such that c is found outside B. Note that
m may already be in the skeleton (added together with some m′ such that m⇒∗ m′) and the rule still be
applicable because needs to be updated. The second rule deals with adding a recipient, if any is found,
to an output node.
Proposition 3. If A −→S A′ then A is not realized or A is not DG.
Proof. If the reduction A −→S A′ is obtained by applying rule (A1), then the cut Cut([M˜]ρ1ρ2 ,B,A) is
clearly not solved. On the other hand, if A −→S A′ by (A2), then we are clearly adding an input node
to a pending output.
In the sequel, we say that a homomorphism H : A 7→ A′ is an augmentation whenever H is an inclu-
sion (identity on the domain A), any node in A′\A belongs to the same strand and A′ is an extension of
A. Directly from the rules, it follows that:
Proposition 4. Let H map A to A′ such that A −→S A′. Then H is an augmentation.
Building on the above proposition, we say that H is of type 1 (type 2) if it corresponds to the appli-
cation of a rule 1 (rule 2).
In the sequel A −→∗S A′ holds whenever there exists a finite sequence A1 −→S . . . −→S Ak such
that A= A1 and A′ = Ak. Moreover, A 6→ whenever there is no A′ such that A −→S A′. The following
result states that we can always reach all the shapes by repeatedly applying the rules.
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Theorem 1 (Completeness).
1. Let A be a single-strand skeleton and H a shape such that A 7→ A′. Then A −→∗S A′ (up-to
isomorphism).
2. Let A be a single-strand skeleton and H a DG shape such that A 7→ A′. Then A −→∗S A′ (up-to
isomorphism).
Proof. From Proposition 4, we only have to prove that shapes can be expressed as the composition of
augmentations of type 1 or 2 (type 2 is only considered when proving point 2). Formally, we show
that there exist a k such that for every i ∈ {0,1 . . . ,k} we have H = Li ◦Hi ◦ . . . ◦H1 ◦H0 where Li is a
node-wise injective homomorphism, H0 the identity mapping and H1, . . . ,Hi augmentations.
The first step is to show how we can find k and inductively construct each Hi and Li starting from the
identity:
• Base Case. As H0 must be the identity, we chose L0 = H noting that H is node-wise injective by
definition of shape. We then have that H = L0 ◦H0.
• Inductive Case. Let H = Li ◦H j ◦ . . . ◦H1 ◦H0 such that H0 is the identity and H1, . . . ,Hi are
augmentations. If Li is an isomorphism then i = k and we can stop. In fact, by definition of shape,
H is the minimum realized skeleton hence the image of H j ◦ . . .◦H1◦H0 is isomorphic toA′, image
of H.
Let Li be not an isomorphism. Moreover, let Li :A j 7→A′ and H j ◦ . . .◦H1 ◦H0 :A 7→A j for some
A j. We show how to construct Hi+1 and Li+1. By definition of shape, as Li is not an isomorphism,
A j is not realized. If that is the case, then either there is a dangling output (this is to be considered
only when proving point 2) or, by Proposition 1, there exists an unsolved cut Cut([M˜]ρ1ρ2 ,B,A j)
i.e., by definition of cut, there exists an input node m1, A j -minimal in Cut([M]ρ1ρ2,B,A′), such
that ρ1 6∈ R and for all [M˜]ρ3ρ4 ∈ B, ρ4 6∈ R. Now, as A′ is realized, all cuts must be solved. Then,
because Li is node-wise injective, we can choose a node in the pre-image of Li which is not in
Ai but solves Cut([M˜]ρ1ρ2 ,B,A j) (or add the corresponding input when proving point 2). Adding
this node, precisely corresponds to an augmentation induced by rule (A1) (or (A2)) which will be
our Hi+1. We can then choose Li+1 to be equal to Li but also mapping the new added node to A′
accordingly.
The above procedure shows how to construct the various Hi and Li. In order to complete the proof, we
need to show that we always find the k. But this follows by the fact that augmentations always increase
the size of a skeleton and observing that we stop once we reach an isomorphism.
Example 2. Let S = {si}i=1,...,5, s1,s2 ∈ ρ1, s3,s4 ∈ ρ2, s5 ∈ ρ3 and such that:
s1 = +[[secret]ρ1ρ3 ]ρ1ρ2 ⇒ −[reject]ρ2ρ1
s2 = +[[secret]ρ1ρ3 ]ρ1ρ2 ⇒ −[[newsecret]ρ3ρ1 ]ρ2ρ1
s3 = − [[secret]ρ1ρ3 ]ρ1ρ2 ⇒ +[reject]ρ2ρ1
s4 = − [[secret]ρ1ρ3 ]ρ1ρ2 ⇒ +[[secret]ρ1ρ3 ]ρ2ρ3 ⇒ −[[newsecret]ρ3ρ1 ]ρ3ρ2 ⇒ +[[newsecret]ρ3ρ1 ]ρ2ρ1
s5 = − [[secret]ρ1ρ3 ]ρ2ρ3 ⇒ +[[newsecret]ρ3ρ1 ]ρ3ρ2
If, for instance, ρ2 ∈ R and we start from s5, we can then apply (A1) for B = /0, M = [secret]ρ1ρ3 and m
being the first node of the strands s1/s2. We obtain the following skeleton:
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• [[secret]ρ1ρ3 ]ρ1ρ2-  [[secret]ρ1ρ3 ]ρ2ρ3- •
ﬀ[[newsecret]ρ3ρ1 ]ρ3ρ2 •
www (4)
which is a shape for s5. If we start from s2, we can then apply (A1) for B = /0, M = [secret]ρ1ρ3 and
m being the second node of s5. We then have:
• [[secret]ρ1ρ3 ]ρ1ρ2-  [[secret]ρ1ρ3 ]ρ2ρ3- •
•
www
ﬀ[[newsecret]ρ3ρ1 ]ρ2ρ1  ﬀ[[newsecret]ρ3ρ1 ]ρ3ρ2 •
www
Above we have actually applied (A1) twice, where the second application just added the top. Note
that (4) differs from the above because the latter has more information about s2 but they are both realized
(and DG).
The set of boxes B is not always empty. For instance, for b = [secret]ρ1ρ3 , with strands
s′2 = +[b]ρ1ρ2 ⇒ −[b]ρ2ρ1
s′4 = − [b]ρ1ρ2 ⇒ +[b]ρ2ρ3 ⇒ −[b]ρ3ρ2 ⇒ +[b]ρ2ρ1
s′5 = − [b]ρ2ρ3 ⇒ +[b]ρ3ρ2
and applying (A1) to s′2 with R = /0, we get the following skeleton for M = b and B = {[b]ρ1ρ2}:
• [b]ρ1ρ2- [b]ρ2ρ3- •
•
www
ﬀ[b]ρ2ρ1  ﬀ[b]ρ3ρ2 •
www
4 A Protocol Description Calculus
We illustrate our ideas with the simplest possible calculus. The syntax of this minimal choreography
language (based on the Global Calculus [4]) is given by the following grammar:
C ::= Σiρ1→ ρ2 : opi〈M˜i〉. Ci (interaction)
| 0 (inactive)
Above, the term Σiρ1 → ρ2 : opi〈M˜i〉. Ci describes an interaction where a branch with label opi is
non-deterministically selected and a message M˜i is sent from role ρ1 to role ρ2. Each two roles in a
choreography share a private channel hence it would be redundant to have them explicit in the syntax
[2]. Term 0 denotes the inactive system. Given a choreography C, we assume that the various op, also
on different interactions, are distinct: given the lack of an iteration operator e.g. recursion, this is a
constraint that can be imposed statically and we include in the well-formedness condition at the end of
this section.
Our mini-language can be equipped with a standard trace semantics with configurations C
µ−→
C′ where µ = (ρ1,ρ2,opi,M˜i) contains the parameters of the interaction performed i.e. ρ1 → ρ2 :
opi〈M˜i〉. Ci (ρ1,ρ2,opi,M˜i)−→ Ci. A sequence of labels {µi}i describes the temporal order in which the various
described communications take place and it is called trace.
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Assumption 1 (Well-Formedness). A choreography C is well-formed whenever:
• All op’s are distinct;
• let Γ be a set of pairs ρ : M˜. Then, Γ `C such that for all ρ , Γ(ρ) has no boxes and ` is defined
by the following rules:
(T-INTERACT)
M˜i ⊆ Γ(ρ1) Γ[ρ2 7→ Γ(ρ2)∪{M˜i}] `Ci ρ2 ∈ top(Ci)
Γ ` Σiρ1→ ρ2 : opi〈M˜i〉. Ci
(T-INACT)
Γ ` 0
(T-BOX1)
Γ `C M˜ ∈ Γ(ρ1)
Γ[ρ1 7→ Γ(ρ1)∪{[M˜]ρ1ρ2}] `C
(T-BOX2)
Γ `C [M˜]ρ1ρ2 ∈ Γ(ρ2)
Γ[ρ2 7→ Γ(ρ2)∪{M˜}] `C
where top(Σiρ1→ ρ2 : opi〈M˜i〉. Ci) = {ρ1} and top(0) =R.
The rules above are a simple static check for ensuring that a box [M˜]ρ1ρ2 always originate by an
interaction from ρ1 and can only be opened by ρ2 upon reception of the box (maybe nested in other
boxes). An environment Γ is a function that associates a set of messages to a role. (T-INTERACT) checks
Γ(ρ1) contains each M˜i and allows ρ2 to use M˜i in Ci. Moreover, the rules checks that ρ2 is the sender in
Ci. (T-BOX1) says that if ρ1 knows M˜ then it can also create [M˜]ρ1ρ2 for any ρ ′. Dually, in (T-BOX2), if
ρ2 knows [M˜]ρ1ρ2 then it also knows M˜. Rule (T-INACT) allows to type 0 with any Γ.
Example 3 (Buyer-Seller Protocol). Hereby, we report a Buyer-Seller financial protocol [4, 3]. A buyer
Buyer asks a seller Seller for a quote about a product. If the quote is accepted, Buyer will send its credit
card card together with the accepted quote to Seller who will forward it to a bank Bank. The bank will
check if payment can be done and, if so, reply with a receipt receipt which will be forwarded to Buyer
by Seller. In our mini-language we use boxes to make sure that the credit card number can only be read
by Bank and that Seller does not change the accepted quote:
1. Buyer→ Seller : Req〈prod〉. Seller→ Buyer : Reply〈quote〉.
2. ( Buyer→ Seller : Accept〈[(quote,card)]BuyerBank〉. Seller→ Bank : Pay〈(quote, [(quote,card)]BuyerBank)〉.
3. ( Bank→ Seller : Ok〈[receipt]BankBuyer〉. Seller→ Buyer : Succ〈[receipt]BankBuyer〉
4. +
5. Bank→ Seller : NotOk〈reason〉. Seller→ Buyer : Fail〈reason〉 )
6. +
7. Buyer→ Seller : Reject〈〉)
Line 1. denotes the quote request and reply. Lines 2. and 7. are computational branches corresponding to
acceptance and rejection of the quote respectively. If the quote is accepted, Buyer will send its credit card
in the box [quote,card]Buyer,Bank meaning that Seller cannot see it. The box is then forwarded to Bank
together with the quote offered by Seller who checks that everything is fine (line 2.). If the transaction
can be finalised, a receipt is forwarded to Buyer. Otherwise, a NotOK message will be delivered. Bank
boxes the receipt so that it cannot be seen or changed by Seller.
4.1 Abstract Strand Semantics
The abstract strand semantics (AS semantics) is the minimum function {{−}} : C→ 2S× (R→ 2S) (for
S a set of strands) satisfying the rules in Table 1. The function inputs a choreography and returns a set
of strands paired with a function that maps strands into a role ρ inR (all the possible runs for ρ). These
strands are templates, and we may use substitutions to “plug in” alternate values for the parameters in
the choreography. Since these parameters do not include the labels opi, we define:
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(AS-COM)
{{Ci}} = (Si,whoi)
{{Σiρ1→ ρ2 : opi〈M˜i〉. Ci}} =⋃i ( extend(Si, [(opi,M˜i)]ρ1ρ2 ,ρ1,ρ2,whoi) )
(AS-ZERO) {{0}} = ({+•ρ}ρ ,λρ. {+•ρ})
Table 1: Abstract Strand Semantics for Choreography
A substitution σ is a parameter substitution if for every label opi, σ(opi) = opi. The strand space
of a choreography C is the strand space generated by applying parameter substitutions to {{C}}. We say
that a skeleton A is over {{C}} if all of its strands belong to this strand space.
Rule (AS-ZERO) gives semantics to the inactive choreography 0 by creating a strand +•ρ for each
role ρ ∈ R. Rule (AS-COM) gives the semantics to the term (interaction) of a choreography. The
idea is to prefix, for every branch, every strand of ρ1 with +[(opi,M˜i)]ρ1ρ2 and every strand of ρ2 with
−[(opi,M˜i)]ρ1ρ2 where, in general, (op,M˜) denotes the vector (op,M1, . . . ,Mk). The main part is played
by the function extend hereby defined as:
extend(S,M,ρ1,ρ2,who) =
 S\(who(ρ1)∪who(ρ2)) ∪{
a⇒ s | (s ∈ who(ρ1)∧a =+M) ∨
(s ∈ who(ρ2)∧a =−M)
} 
The above definition says that we include all those strands which are not in who(ρ1) and in who(ρ2).
Then, we must prefix all those strands in who(ρ1) with node +M and all those strands in who(ρ2) with
−M. For well-formed choreographies, we have the following:
Proposition 5. Let C be a well-formed choreography and (S,who) its semantics. Then each message
[M˜]ρ1ρ2 always originates in who(ρ1) and can only be opened in who(ρ2).
Example 4 (Semantics of the Buyer-Seller Protocol). Unlike in [3], because of the presence of corrupted
roles (and participants), we cannot give the semantics of a choreography describing a security protocol
simply by giving a set of executions. Therefore, the semantics of the buyer-seller protocol is a set
of strands from which we would like to build the possible executions depending on which roles are
compromised. Given the choreography in Example 3, we get the following strands:
a) + [(Req,prod)]BS⇒−[(Reply,quote)]SB⇒+[(Accept, [(quote,card)]BBk)]BS⇒−[(Succ, [receipt]BkB)]SB
b) + [(Req,prod)]BS⇒−[(Reply,quote)]SB⇒+[(Accept, [(quote,card)]BBk)]BS⇒−[(Fail,reason)]SB
c) + [(Req,prod)]BS⇒−[(Reply,quote)]SB⇒+[Reject]BS
d) − [(Req,prod)]BS⇒+[(Reply,quote)]SB⇒−[(Accept, [(quote,card)]BBk)]BS⇒
⇒+[(Pay,quote, [(quote,card)]BBk)]SBk⇒−[(Ok, [receipt]BkB)]BkS⇒+[(Succ, [receipt]BkB)]SB
e) − [(Req,prod)]BS⇒+[(Reply,quote)]SB⇒−[(Accept, [(quote,card)]BBk)]BS⇒
⇒+[(Pay,quote, [(quote,card)]BBk)]SBk⇒−[(NotOk,reason)]BkS⇒+[(Fail,reason)]SB
f ) − [(Req,prod)]BS⇒+[(Reply,quote)]SB⇒−[Reject]BS
g) − [(Pay,quote, [(quote,card)]BBk)]SBk⇒+[(Ok, [receipt]BkB)]BkS
h) − [(Pay,quote, [(quote,card)]BBk)]SBk⇒+[(NotOk,reason)]BkS
where B is the buyer, S is the seller and Bk is the bank. Above, strands a), b) and c) belong to B while
d), e) and f ) belong to S. Strands g) and h) are instead the local behaviour of Bk.
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4.2 Realized Skeletons for Choreography
We now apply the theory developed in the previous section to abstract spaces which are in fact the
semantics of a choreography.
In the sequel we say that A is over {{C}} whenever it is obtained from the regular, non compromised
strands in {{C}}. The following result states that whenever (A1) is not applicable, we have reached a
realized skeleton.
Lemma 1 (Realized Skeletons). Let C be a well-formed choreography and let A be a skeleton over {{C}}
such that (A1) is not applicable. Then A is realized.
Proof. By Proposition 1, A′ is realized if and only if all its cuts are solved. Let us assume, by contradic-
tion, that Cut([M]ρ1ρ2 ,B,A) is unsolved for some [M]ρ1ρ2 and B.
By Proposition 2, we know that alsoCut([M]ρ1ρ2 ,B
′,A) is unsolved for B′= {b | n′≺A n s.t. [M˜]ρ1ρ2 @
b v msg(n′)∧ rcv(b) 6∈ R } for some A-minimal input node n in Cut([M]ρ1ρ2 ,B,A) and ρ1 6∈ R. As a
consequence, we also have that [M˜]ρ1ρ2 †
B′msg(n).
Now, if we prove the existence of some positive node m 6∈ A such that ∀m′ .m′ ≺A n∨m′ ⇒+ m
implies [M˜]ρ1ρ2 B
′
msg(m′) where [M˜]ρ1ρ2 †B
′
msg(m) and m 6∈ R then we can apply (A1) to A hence
having a contradiction. We distinguish two cases:
• B′ = /0. In this case, the unsolved cut is saying that we must explain where the box c has been
created. As ρ1 is not compromised, we must add a node belonging to ρ1 sending c. The existence
of such a node is ensured by well-formedness.
• B′ 6= /0. As B is non-empty, then we must explain how c has come out of some message box [M˜′]ρ3ρ4
in B. But if that is the case, as ρ4 is not compromised, a node belonging to ρ4 must have performed
such operation. The existence of such a node is ensured by well-formedness.
Note that in both cases above, we are exploiting the fact that the two well-formedness conditions impose
that the operations for creation and opening of a box are performed consistently on the same choreogra-
phy branches i.e. role strands.
The following result states that whenever (A2) is not applicable to A then A is DG.
Lemma 2. Let C be a well-formed choreography and let A be a skeleton over {{C}} such that (A2) is not
applicable. Then A is DG.
Proof. If that is not the case then, by definition of delivery guaranteed skeleton, we would be able to
apply (A2). This is simply because whenever we add a positive node n to A we always have another
strand belonging to a different role and containing a negative node m such that msg(m) =msg(n).
We finally have the following two results:
Theorem 2 (Soundness). Let A be a single-stranded skeleton over {{C}} and let A −→∗S A′ 6→. Then,
A′ is a DG shape.
Proof. By the previous lemmas, we know that A′ is realized and DG. We must prove that there exists a
homomorphism H : A 7→ A′ which is a shape.
As A −→∗S A′ then, by Proposition 4, we can choose H = Hk ◦ . . .◦H0 where Hi :Ai 7→Ai+1 for for
A0 = A and Ak+1 = A′ and some Ai. We shall prove that Hk ◦ . . .◦Hi : Ai 7→ A′ is a shape for Ai for all
i. We do it by induction on j = k− i.
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• Base Case. j= 1. We have to prove that Hk :Ak 7→A′ is a shape forAk. By Proposition 3, we know
that Ak is not realized and/or not DG. Hence, Hk must be the minimum homomorphism mapping
Ak to a DG realized skeleton. In fact, both (A1) and (A2), add the minimum node explaining a
box or receiving a pending output.
• Inductive Case. Let us assume that j = i+ 1. By induction hypothesis we know that Hk ◦ . . . ◦
Hi+1 : Ai+1 7→ A′ is a shape for Ai+1. But then, as augmentations are minimal strictly monotone
embedding with respect to shapes, we have that also Hk ◦ . . .◦Hi : Ai 7→ A′ is a shape for Ai.
Theorem 3 (Termination). Let A be a single-stranded skeleton over {{C}}. Then, we can reduce A only
a finite number of times.
Proof. {{C}} is finite and the reduction rules are augmentation (increase the number of nodes). As the
same node cannot be added twice, we must eventually exhaust all nodes.
Example 5 (Shapes of the Buyer-Seller Protocol). We show how to compute some shapes of the Buyer-
Seller protocol starting from its semantics given in the previous section. We start from the buyer’s strand
a) assuming that seller is compromised. Applying (A1) to its fourth node, we get:
• [(Req,prod)]BS -
•
www
ﬀ [(Reply,quote)]SB
•
www
[(Accept, [(quote,card)]BBk)]BS-  [(Pay,quote, [(quote,card)]BBk)]SBk- •
•
www
ﬀ [(Succ, [receipt]BkB)]SB  ﬀ [(Ok, [receipt]BkB)]BkS •
www
Note that, we have actually applied (A1) twice: the second time it was applied to the first node of the
new strand and its result was only adding the relation . The image of the shape for strand b), the case
when the bank does not accept the transaction, is similar. Let us now consider d) and let us assume that
buyer is compromised. In this case, for M = [(Pay,quote[(quote,card)]BBk)]SBk, by applying (A1)
(twice) we get:
[(Req,prod)]BS - •
ﬀ [(Reply,quote)]SB •
www
ﬀ[(Accept, [(quote,card)]BBk)]BS •
www
•
www
M -  M - •
•
www
ﬀ[(Ok, [receipt]BkB)]BkS  ﬀ[(Ok, [receipt]BkB)]BkS •
www
[(Succ, [receipt]BkB)]SB - •
www
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Example 6. Let us consider a slightly different version of the Buyer-Seller protocol, where the buyer
does not include the quote together with her credit card. In particular we would have the new following
strands (the missing ones are unchanged):
a′) + [(Req,prod)]BS⇒−[(Reply,quote)]SB⇒+[(Accept, [card]BBk)]BS⇒−[(Succ, [receipt]BkB)]SB
b′) + [(Req,prod)]BS⇒−[(Reply,quote)]SB⇒+[(Accept, [card]BBk)]BS⇒−[(Fail,reason)]SB
d′) − [(Req,prod)]BS⇒+[(Reply,quote)]SB⇒−[(Accept, [card]BBk)]BS⇒
⇒+[(Pay,quote, [card]BBk)]SBk⇒−[(Ok, [receipt]BkB)]BkS⇒+[(Succ, [receipt]BkB)]SB
e′) − [(Req,prod)]BS⇒+[(Reply,quote)]SB⇒−[(Accept, [card]BBk)]BS⇒
⇒+[(Pay,quote, [card]BBk)]SBk⇒−[(NotOk,reason)]BkS⇒+[(Fail,reason)]SB
g′) − [(Pay,quote, [card]BBk)]SBk⇒+[(Ok, [receipt]BkB)]BkS
h′) − [(Pay,quote, [card]BBk)]SBk⇒+[(NotOk,reason)]BkS
If the seller is corrupted, starting from g′) and applying (A1) to its first node, we get the realized skeleton:
• [(Req,prod)]BS -
•
www
ﬀ [(Reply,quote)]SB
•
www
[(Accept, [card]BBk)]BS-  [(Pay,quote’, [card]BBk)]SBk- •
ﬀ [(Ok, [receipt]BkB)]BkS •
www
The realized skeleton above shows a flaw, or at least an undesirable aspect of this version of the
protocol. The value quote that the client accepted can be different from quote’ received by the bank,
allowing for the seller to cheat on the quote agreed with the buyer.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we have used the strand space framework to study the possible behaviors of choreographies
executing in the presence of compromised principals. In this framework, the strands of the uncompro-
mised regular participants can freely interact with each other and with behaviors possible for corrupted
parties. We clarified these behaviors by presenting a pair of transition rules which generate all of the
minimal, essentially different executions.
It is a strength of this approach that it allows us to formulate and characterize a number of interest-
ing properties. For instance, what about the relationship between shapes (namely minimal executions)
and other, possibly non-minimal executions? One might expect that non-minimal executions would be
disjoint unions of copies of shapes. However, this intuition requires a property of choreographies, which
may be characterized syntactically. In effect, it requires that when the choreography has a choice, then
the same principals are active across both branches of the choice (except possibly the last principal on
one branch). This corresponds to an assumption of [6]. We also conjecture that, under these assump-
tions, shapes are run-once i.e. they are such that there is at most one strand belonging to each role. In
future work we intend to explore properties of this kind, in particular when the choreography language
is extended with parallel composition and recursive behaviour.
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We also intend to study the relation between protocol descriptions at the choreography-and-box level
and at the concrete cryptographic level. We intend to investigate properties of protocol transformations
in general [10] in order to develop fine-grained principles governing how to generate cryptographic
implementations for choreographies requiring security infrastructures.
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